作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《科技管理研究》 2011年第23期32-34,42,共4页

摘　　要： 从博弈论角度分析我国食品安全中的监管问题,建立和分析了地方监管部门与中央监管部门的博弈模型,结合"三鹿奶粉"事件分析认为,作为社会利益的代表,中央政府必须承担起相应责任,加强对地方部门的监管,以免其与企业合谋,并调整其激励机制,明确其责任追索制度;最后结合最新刑法修正案提出的问责制建议营造重视食品安全的软环境。 This article analyzes the reasons why food safety problems often appear in China from the game view. It sets up dynamic game models of local regulatory authorities and the central regulatory authorities. It points out that Central Government must bear the corresponding responsibility as the social interest representatives, strengthen the supervision of local departments, and adjust its incentive mechanism. Finally the author suggests creating the food safety - oriented atmosphere by means of offering a soft environment of food safety such as credibility, social culture, etc.

关 键 词： 食品安全 监管部门 博弈

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]