作　　者： ;

机构地区： 肇庆学院经济与管理学院

出　　处： 《企业经济》 2011年第11期56-60,共5页

摘　　要： 本文将经理人股票期权计划形成的交易作为基本的分析对象,首先探讨经理人股票期权交易的性质——激励性股票期权交易是企业为了获得经理人在等待期提供的边际服务;授予经理人非激励性股票期权是对经理人过去服务的补偿,或者是经理人对利润的分享。在此基础上,对经理人股票期权会计确认的"利润分配"进行了分析,指出将经理人股票期权交易认定为"利润分配"是错误的;对经理人股票期权会计计量的两种主要观点"混合计量"和"授予日计量"进行了分析,其主要错误在于将经理人股票期权交易所形成的合同义务认定为股票期权。最后,本文提出了与交易性质相吻合的经理人股票期权的会计确认和计量方法。 Taking the transaction brought about by executive stock option plan as basic analytical object, this paper starts with the exploration about the nature of executive stock option （ESO） transaction - incentive stock option transaction is marginal service that the enterprises provide to acquire executives during the waiting periods, granting executives nonincentive stock option is a compensation for the managers for their past services, or, for the managers sharing profits. And thus, the paper has analyzed the distribution of profits identified by executive stock option accounting and pointed out that it is wrong to regard executive stock option transaction as＂distribution of profits＂. Furthermore, the paper has analyzed the＂mixed measurement＂, and＂grant date measurement＇that are two main views of executive stock option accounting measurement, and believed that its main error is to identify contractual obligation brought about by executive stock option transaction as stock option. At last, the paper has come up with accounting identification and measurement method of executive stock option matching the transaction nature.

关 键 词： 股票期权 经理人股票期权 经理人股票期权计划 经理人股票期权交易 边际服务 合同义务

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]