作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学经济与管理学院

出　　处： 《经济视角（下）》 2008年第5期22-25,共4页

摘　　要： 改革开放多年来,地方政府日益成为具有独立利益和决策权利的经济主体,招商引资工作成为一项重要事项和政府政绩考核的重要指标。研究地方政府在招商引资上如何竞争,选择怎样的竞争策略对社会利益最好,以及地方政府选择竞争策略的原因,成为了一个重要的问题。本文从博弈论的角度探究地方政府在对抗竞争和合作竞争中的不同决策和不同收益,并由此得到一些结论并提出建议。 Since the institution of the reform and open policy for many years in China,local governments have gradually become the economic subjects of independent interests and decisive rights.Attracting investments has become a vital task of local governments and one of the important indexes of assessing their performance as well.Therefore,it becomes important to study how local governments compete in attracting investments,what competing strategies should be adopted,and why do they choose particular competing strategies.This article studies the local governments' different decisions and achievements in antagonistic competition and cooperative competition from the view of game theory.Finally,the article arrives at some conclusions and puts forwards relevant suggestions.

关 键 词： 招商引资 博弈 地方政府

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]