作　　者： ; (徐向阳）;

机构地区： 华南理工大学

出　　处： 《中国经济问题》 2011年第6期90-95,106,共7页

摘　　要： 道德风险引起的搭便车是使团队效率低下的重要原因,传统理论认为让一个具有剩余索取权的人发挥监督职能将有效解决这一问题。但实际上,为使监督者有积极性监督别人,并不需要赋予监督者剩余索取权。在一个团队合作的博弈中,委托人只需采用一个歧视性的激励机制,即科层制度,使监督者和被监督者都选择努力工作构成一个纳什均衡。科层制度使得完成相同任务的代理人具有不同的收益,因此本质上是一个具有监督功能的歧视性激励机制。企业的科层性质大大减少了激励成本,并使得某些面临囚徒困境的合作得以实现。 Moral hazard is an important reason which incurs teamwork＇ s low efficiency. Traditional theory holds that people who have the residual claim to exert oversight functions can settle this problem effectively, the firm is essentially a monitoring mechanism. But, in fact, in order to enable the supervisors who have activity to supervise others, we do not need to give the residual claim to the supervisors. In a team game,the principal can design a discriminatory incentives, make supervisors and supervisees （ under the supervision of the supervisor） choosing hardworking to constitute a Nash equilibrium. The hierarchical nature of the firm greatly reduces the incentive costs, and make certain cooperation which face the Prisoner＇s Dilemma can be achieved.

关 键 词： 道德风险 科层 代理人 监督

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]