作　　者： ;

机构地区： 上海财经大学会计学院

出　　处： 《广西财经学院学报》 2011年第6期46-49,87,共5页

摘　　要： 金融危机爆发以来,包括中国在内的世界各国纷纷制定出各种限制高管薪酬的规定,以期能遏制高管不合理的薪酬,促进企业健康地发展。因此,对"限薪令"能否起到预期的效果进行理论研究具有重要的现实意义。运用基于公平理论的委托—代理模型对此进行了理论解释。求出了该模型的子博弈精练纳什均衡,并进一步研究了选择薪酬和连续努力水平的委托—代理模型博弈。研究的结果表明:只有针对"限薪令"制定出具体的、充分体现出"效率优先、兼顾公平"原则的实施细则,各种"限薪令"才可能取得预期的效果。 Since the outbreak of the financial crisis,lots of countries in the world including China have set executive pay limits to hold back the unreasonable executive compensation and prompt the healthy development of enterprises.Therefore theoretical research on whether these regulations can serve the desired results is of great practical significance.This paper gives a theoretical explanation for this issue by applyingt the principal-agent model based on equity theory.The research works out the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the model,and then further studies the game in principal-agent model which chooses salary and continuous effort level.The result indicates that various executive pay limits might achieve the desired results only when the detailed implementation rules are established and fully embody the principle of efficiency priority and consideration to fairness.

关 键 词： 限薪令 公平理论 委托 代理模型

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]