机构地区: 华南理工大学工商管理学院
出 处: 《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》 2011年第9期19-27,共9页
摘 要: 为了研究关联担保隧道效应行为,本文推导了控股股东通过关联担保追求隐性收益的公式,分析投资效率、应收项目和关联担保的关系。实证结果表明,只与控股股东关联担保上市公司和只与子公司、参股公司关联担保上市公司,其控股股东都通过关联担保获得了隐性收益,说明上市公司关联担保偏好的原因主要来自资金侵占而非控制权掠夺。 In order to make a research on relative guarantee tunnel effect, in this paper, we ob tain a formula of shareholders pursuing hidden benefit by relative guarantee. And it turns out that shareholders of listed companies that have a relationship with shareholders, subsdiary and sharing companies,have hidden benefit. Therefore, it concludes that the preference reason of relative guarantee lies in cash occupation instead of control power plunder.
领 域: [经济管理]