机构地区: 厦门大学管理学院
出 处: 《经济管理》 2011年第9期63-74,共12页
摘 要: 股东关系是内在于股东之间的关系网络,可能对股东的行为选择产生决定性影响。本文以解禁股份减持中的其他大股东减持事件为研究对象,从股东关系角度考察这一过程中的股东合谋问题。研究结合特定制度背景,采用关联关系、公司发起人身份、股权性质异同等多个角度描述、测度我国上市公司的股东关系,并在此基础上检验发现,股东关系影响了股东对合谋行为的选择。股东关系越密切,减持时其他大股东越可能借助与公司第一大股东之间的合谋获取较高的减持收益。并且,其他大股东在上市公司的影响力对这种合谋行为具有显著促进作用。最后,法治水平、市场化进程等地区治理水平的提升,将有助于抑制由股东关系引发的合谋行为。上述研究结论为考察上市公司股东合谋、利益输送等问题提出了新思路,也为加强限售股份解限后的交易监管、完善市场投资者保护提供了理论依据。 From the viewpoint of shareholders relationship, this paper studies shareholders collusion in the reduction of originally non-tradable shares. We find that shareholders relationship influences choices of collusion in shares selling. The closer the relationship with the biggest shareholder, the higher the reduction benefits that blockholders might obtain through colluding with the biggest shareholder in the company. Influences of blockhoders on companies enhance the possibility of shareholders collusion caused by shareholders relationship. And the development level of law and marketization will restrain the collusion between shareholders. Our study discusses and measures shareholders relationship from aspects including related parties, identities of sponsors and nature of shareholders for the purpose of investigating shareholders relationship comprehensively and ensuring the reliability of research results.