作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 哈尔滨工业大学

出　　处： 《工程管理学报》 2011年第4期399-404,共6页

摘　　要： 公益性公共建筑节能一般由政府和建筑业主共同出资,而业主在节能过程中存在着特殊的行为特征,尤其是因隐藏信息和隐藏行为而导致的逆向选择和道德风险行为。在深入分析公益性公共建筑节能激励机理基础上,运用激励理论,建立了政府和公益性公共建筑业主之间的委托—代理模型,并分别在完全信息和不对称信息下求解了相应的激励契约。研究得出了两种情况下激励契约的一些特征,同时,也为政府建议了一些可能的措施和机制,以达到激励公益性公共建筑节能的目的。 Commonweal public building energy efficiency is usually jointly invested by the government and owners.The owners have special behavior characteristics in building energy efficiency,especially adverse selection and moral hazard behaviors caused by their hidden knowledge and hidden actions.Based on the analysis of incentive mechanism for commonweal public building energy efficiency and the usage of incentive theory,this paper established the principal-agent model between the government and owners,and designed the incentive contract with complete information and asymmetric information respectively.Some characteristics of the incentive contract with complete information and asymmetric information were summarized.The measures and mechanisms were proposed for the government to implement the incentives on commonweal public building energy efficiency.

关 键 词： 公益性公共建筑 建筑节能 激励契约 委托 代理模型

领　　域： [经济管理]