作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 深圳大学管理学院

出　　处： 《系统管理学报》 2011年第4期398-405,共8页

摘　　要： 考虑了一个风险厌恶型的零售商面临依赖价格的随机需求的供应链合作博弈问题。零售商以条件在险价值(CVaR)作为其风险衡量,制造商为风险中性,研究了最优均衡批发价格、零售价格和订货量,从而发现,在加法需求模式下,具有相同协商权利时的Nash博弈问题和具有不同协商权利时的Nash博弈问题都存在均衡解,并将加法需求模式与一般随机需求的情况进行比较分析,发现当需求噪声服从均匀分布时,在加法需求模式下,制造商占整个供应链的利润比例比在一般随机需求情况下的大。 We consider a channel bargaining problem in which a risk-averse retailer faces a price-dependent stochastic demand.Using the conditional value-at-risk（CVaR） as the risk measure,we study the wholesale price,selling price and order quantity under optimal equilibrium and find that there exist equilibria for the equal bargaining-power problem as well as for the unequal bargaining-power problem in the additive demand model.We also study comparative statics to show how the manufacturer＇s profit-share changes with respect to the retailer＇s risk-averse level and the retailer＇s bargaining power.We compare our results under the additive demand model with the general stochastic demand model and find that the profit-share of the manufacturer under the additive demand model is greater than that under the general stochastic demand model when the demand risk follows a uniform distribution.

关 键 词： 供应链管理 合作博弈 讨价还价 加法需求模式 条件在险价值

领　　域： [经济管理] [社会学] [理学] [理学]