作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学经济与管理学院

出　　处： 《财经研究》 2011年第8期69-78,共10页

摘　　要： 大股东的存在加强了对经理人的监督,但存在大股东掏空时经理人会与大股东谈判以降低其业绩标准,从而削弱经理人的薪酬激励监督。文章将大股东掏空与经理人薪酬激励纳入同一分析框架,探讨两者的相互作用。研究发现,大股东掏空降低了经理人的业绩薪酬激励强度,并且实际控制人性质也影响这种激励强度。文章的研究为更全面地了解大股东的作用和两类代理成本的相互影响提供了参考。 The existence of major shareholders strengthens the supervision of managers, but if there is tunneling behavior of major shareholders, managers will negotiate with major shareholders in order to reduce their performance standards, thereby weakening the pay incentive supervision of managers. This paper incorporates tunneling behavior of major shareholders and executive compensation incentives into an analytical framework and discusses the interaction. It finds that tunneling behavior of major shareholders results in the reduction in the incentive intensity of executive compensation which is affected by the characters of real controllers. This paper provides some reference for the comprehensive understanding of the role of major shareholders and the interaction between two types of agency costs.

关 键 词： 掏空 资金占用 业绩薪酬敏感性 激励强度

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]