作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学岭南学院

出　　处： 《中国工业经济》 2011年第4期35-43,共9页

摘　　要： 近年来,地方政府官员热衷于出让土地,现有文献主要强调土地财政。地方政府官员不仅面临财政激励而且还面临政治激励:在地方政府官员晋升以GDP为主要考核指标的激励下,地方政府官员有土地招商引资的动机。本文在理论上证明了,在一个政治集权经济分权的经济体,地方政府官员出让土地的"土地财政"和"土地引资"动机同时存在;在实证上,我们采用省级面板数据发现,地方政府官员热衷于出让土地是源于"土地引资",而非"土地财政"。本文的工作意味着,中国的土地问题是与土地市场之外的因素联动的,解决中国的土地问题需要土地市场之外的联动改革。 Chinese local officials supplied much more land these years than before, and existing literatures look for the reason in the view of land finance. Actually, local officials are faced with fiscal incentive and political incentive simuhaneously. Local officials have the motive of attracting investment by land policy when central government evaluates them by economic performance. This paper theoretically proved that, in a political centralized and economic decentralized economy, local officials can make fiscal balance better and attract more capital investment by land supply; We then evidently found that the main incentive of land supply by local officials is investment promotion rather than fiscal balancing using Chinese provincial panel data. This finding means that China＇s land issues links with factors outside the land market, and linked reforms outside the land market are needed to solve China＇s land problems.

关 键 词： 地方政府官员 土地供给 增长的政治经济学

领　　域： [经济管理]