作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 对外经济贸易大学金融学院

出　　处： 《经济研究》 2011年第3期119-130,共12页

摘　　要： 私募基金是一种新兴的资产管理模式,其本质上也是一种委托代理契约。本文利用Tirole(2006)的公司融资分析框架和思想,研究了私募基金管理者与基金外部投资人的委托代理关系,求解出私募基金的最优管理规模和分成比例,并用数值计算方法对理论结果进行了讨论。理论模型和数值计算表明:私募基金的最优管理规模和分成比例是存在的;只有在某些特定的参数组合下,现实中广泛使用的"2—20"合同才具有某种合理性,且并非最优;业绩表现费有助于降低私募基金管理者的道德风险。 As an emerging asset management model, privately offered filnd and its investors form a principal agent contract in essence. Based on the corporate finance analytical framework and theory of Tirole （2006） , this paper examined the principal agent relationship between the managers of privately offered fund and the external investors, and figured out the optimal asset under management and share-cropping proportion of private fund. Finally, we used numerical calculation to discuss the outcomes from this theory. The resuhs indicated that the optimal asset under management and share-cropping proportion of private fund do exist, that the prevailing ＂2--20＂ contract is not optimal but reasonable only with the combination of eertain parameters, and that the performance fee of privately offered fund contributes to the reduction of moral hazard by its managers.

关 键 词： 私募基金 管理规模 激励契约

领　　域： [经济管理]