机构地区: 石河子大学经济与管理学院
出 处: 《南开管理评论》 2010年第5期61-69,共9页
摘 要: 本文以2002-2006年非金融行业的上市公司为样本,考察公司超额持有现金是否导致过度投资,进而检验公司治理环境的改善能否抑制超额持有现金导致的过度投资行为,以及公司治理环境的这种作用是否与公司终极控制人性质有关。结果发现,公司超额持有现金会导致过度投资行为,而公司治理环境的改进有利于抑制公司超额持有现金导致的过度投资行为,但上市公司的国有性质弱化了公司治理环境的这种治理效应。 Cash-holdings decision is an important part of corporate financial activities.Based on the perspectives of tade-off theory, agency cost,investor legal protection and industry characteristics, foreign scholars not only investigated the factors influencing corporate cash-holdings, but also concerned about the value effect or economic consequences of corporate (excess) cash-holdings.However, looking at the domestic research, much more literature still adhere to the motivations and value of corporate cash-holdings, and have not involved with the underlying causes and specific mechanisms or paths that weakening the value of cash-holdings of our listed companies.This paper intends to focus on the maters mentioned above.Using the data from 2002 to 2006 of Chinese non-financial listed companies as samples, this paper empirically exam-ines whether excess cash-holdings lead to over-investment, and further examines whether the improvement of corporate governance environment can restrains the behavior of over-investment caused by excess cash-holdings, and then investigates whether the above effect of corporate gov-ernance environment is influenced by the nature of the firms' ultimately controllers.Our empirical results show that the excess cash holdings will lead to over-investment, improved corporate governance environment is conducive to curb the firm's over-investment behaviors resulting from excess cash-holdings, but the role of corporate governance environment is weaker in state-owned companies.The main contributions of this paper are as follows:(1) our findings provide new evidence to understand the specific paths that weakening listed companies' cash-holdings value; (2) the paper also reveals the role of governance environment on corporate governance efficiency from the perspective of firm's cash-holdings.Our results indicate that the decisions of corporate cash-holdings should not only probe into the characteristics of that micro-governance mechanisms, but also pay attention to the corporate gov