作 者: ;
机构地区: 南京大学经济学院经济学系
出 处: 《科学学与科学技术管理》 2010年第10期34-40,共7页
摘 要: 知识产权保护行为不仅是一个法律问题,更是一个深层次的经济问题。通过经济均衡的博弈模型集中分析知识产权利益主体的选择倾向,并从模型分析中得出若干结论,不仅较全面地解释了知识产权保护行为的内在动因问题,也为全面加强知识产权保护开辟了更有效的经济途径。 The action about intellectual property protection is not only one legal problem,but also one deep economic problem.By analyzing the choice tendency of stakeholders involved with intellectual property through game model of economic equilibrium,we can draw some conclusions from the analyses and get a more comprehensive explanation to the behavior of intellectual property protection resulted from inherent dynamic causes.And it can provide a more effective economic approach for strengthening intellectual property protection comprehensively.
领 域: [经济管理]