机构地区: 东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院
出 处: 《系统工程》 2010年第6期88-93,共6页
摘 要: 从社会结构角度出发,运用演化博弈理论分析了在相对均质的社会结构和市场机制下产生阶层分化的社会结构下,群体性突发事件的不同产生机理。在相对均质的社会结构下,当政府部门采取"无为而治"的策略时,随机性发生的冲突事件不会演化为大范围爆发的群体性突发事件;当市场机制导致社会阶层产生分化时,无论社会强势群体还是弱势群体,在争夺某种稀缺性资源时都倾向于达到对自己最为有利的稳定均衡状态。群体性突发事件的爆发程度取决于社会群体的初始状态和不同社会群体获得的相对利益大小;其持续时间取决于社会群体的行为调整能力和政府部门应急处置能力。最后,运用基于Multi-agent仿真技术对理论分析结论进行了实验模拟。 From the viewpoint of social structure,the paper analyzes the engendering mechanism of mass emergency using evolutionary game theory,which are relative homogeneous social structure and social structure with polarization of social strata caused by market mechanism.When government adopts the strategy of "governing by doing nothing that is against nature" under the relative homogeneous social structure,the incident that stochastically happens couldn't develop into mass emergency in large-scale.When market mechanism causes the polarization of social strata,whether the strong group or vulnerable group,they would choose the stable equlibrium strategy advantageous to themselves,where the occurrence degree of mass emergecy depends on the initial state of social groups and the relative benefits among different social groups,and the convergent time is dicided by the learning ability of social groups and emergency handling ability of government.Lastly,Experimental simulation by the multi-agent simulation technology is conducted.