作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

出　　处： 《南开管理评论》 2010年第4期28-34,43,共8页

摘　　要： 本文基于MRR模型,引入股权转让和管理层薪酬,实证研究公司股权、管理层激励与信息非对称之间的关系。研究表明,公司内部人显著提高了交易过程的信息非对称程度,而机构投资者则显著降低了交易过程的信息非对称程度。上市公司股权越集中,信息非对称程度越低。股权转让和管理层激励都不同程度地降低了信息非对称程度,且股权激励的效果比薪酬激励更加显著。 The issue of information asymmetry in securities trad- ing is an important subject in the market microstructure theory. It does not only affect a company＇s decision of investment and financing, but also its value. The issue of information asymmetry also has an influence on the liquidity and operation efficiency of the stock market. With an astonishing number of 60 percent, China＇s securities market has a relatively higher degree of information asymmetry than that of other countries. Such a high degree of information asymmetry will obviously lower the liquidity and efficiency of the securities market. All these have led us to study the issue of information asymmetry so as to find out its influencing factors and in which direction and to what extent will it influence the securities market. Of course, lots of factors influence information asymmetry, but insiders, institutional investors and ownership concentration are most important ones. All these three are related to corporate equity. As the foundation of corporate governance structure, corporate equity has a significant effect on the degree of information asymmetry. So we absolutely should consider the corporate equity as an influencing factor when studying the issue of information asymmetry. Based on MRR model, this paper introduces two new explanatory variables - equity transfer and executive compensation to empirically study the information asymmetry＇s relationship with corporate equity and management incentive. The result shows that the insiders significantly increase the degree of information asymmetry in securities trading while the institutional investors significantly lower it. The more of that ownership is concentrated in a listed company, the lower degree of information asymmetry. Both the equity transfer and management incentive can lower the degree of information asymmetry in a greater or lesser extent. We have also found that the ownership incentive has a more significant effect than remuneration incentive. Based on the above conclu- sions, we

关 键 词： 公司股权 管理层激励 信息非对称 模型

领　　域： [经济管理]