机构地区: 广东工业大学管理学院
出 处: 《管理学报》 2010年第8期1152-1158,共7页
摘 要: 通过扩展经典的Lanchester模型,构建了双寡头企业通过商誉积累和产品质量改进活动为市场份额而竞争的微分博弈模型;研究企业通过商誉吸引新顾客,而产品质量作为建立和维持目标顾客忠诚度的双寡头企业最优广告与产品质量竞争策略。在不同初值条件下,对微分博弈的开环Nash均衡的最优控制策略进行数值分析,得出对企业实践有所裨益的结论。 This paper formulates a differential game model by extending the classical Lanchester model which involves two duopolistic firms competing for market share through goodwill accumulation and quality improvement activities,and investigates the optimal advertising and quality improvement strategies for the two duopolistic firms in which the goodwill is devoted to attracting new customers. By using the numerical analysis methods to define the optimal control path for advertising and quality improvement efforts for the duopolistic firms,the paper obtains some beneficial conclusions for company practice.