作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学法学院

出　　处： 《法律科学（西北政法大学学报）》 2010年第3期74-79,共6页

摘　　要： 牢头狱霸现象在我国的监狱和看守所中长期存在,国家机关希望通过法律和政策对其进行打击,但这种现象却屡禁不止。对于牢头狱霸的产生原因和解决方式,相关的法律经济学分析尚属空白。本文通过非合作的完全信息静态博弈理论对新老囚犯的行为进行分析,揭示了在管制资源不足的状况下,管理者在制度选择时宁可冒着承担法律责任的风险,依然选择产生牢头狱霸制度的深层原因和动机。在此基础上,本文还进一步分析了这种非正式制度的优势和不足,并对我国的狱政管理提出相应的立法和政策建议。 In order to disentangle the issue why ＂ godfather＂ of prisoners is created in the prisons, thus, a research approach based on complete information game in the perspective of law and economics is being discussed. The strategies chosen by new and old prisoners will positively influence the institutions and rules in prison management while the prison＇s resources are limited, then the analysis gives an explanation to the question why rules which will create ＂ godfather＂ of prisoners are adopted at the risk of breaking the present law, on the basis of which, the advantages and disadvantages of present institutions in prison management are further studied and regarding legislation solutions to it are also proposed.

关 键 词： 牢头狱霸 博弈论 立法 制度

领　　域： [政治法律]