作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东商学院会计学院

出　　处： 《山西财经大学学报》 2010年第4期100-105,共6页

摘　　要： 审计师的异化行为是其权衡收益与风险的最终选择,合谋行为与利益收入必然存在内在联系,但审计合谋极其隐蔽,获知内幕极难。间接的办法是,从证券监管机构的处罚公告中选取合谋样本,再选配正常公司构成总体样本,构建审计收费估计模型,计算其中正常收费部分,用实际收费减去正常收费得到异常审计收费。最后,控制审计收费溢价其他影响因素,对审计合谋与异常审计收费的关系进行多元回归检验。实证结果表明,合谋会计师事务所存在异常审计收费行为。 Auditor smake the final choice of behavior alienation after weighing benefits and risks.There must be some internal relations between audit collusion with economic interests.But audit collusion is extremely secret,so it is very difficult to know the improper benefits got by auditor sdirectly.The indirect approach is：firstly,from the securities regulatory body having made the public punishment report on frauds of listed companies,selecting the listed companies which audit collusion occurred in as collusive samples,and matching normal companies together to constitute the overall sample.Considering the factors affecting industry,construct the estimated audit fees model,which calculate the normal part of the audit fees.The abnormal audit fees are estimated by using the actual charges minus normal fees.Then the relations ship between audit collusion with the abnormal audit fees are tested as well,by controlling the impact of premium audit fees.Positive results showed that：the accounting firm involved in audit collusion got abnormal audit fees.

关 键 词： 财务报告舞弊 审计合谋 审计收费溢价 异常审计收费

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]