作　　者： ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学公共管理学院

出　　处： 《自然辩证法通讯》 2010年第2期9-14,共6页

摘　　要： 本文首先对蒯因与卡尔纳普关于分析性的争论作出评析,指出卡尔纳普基本上同意蒯因用于驳斥分析性的那些论点而否认它们会对分析性带来不利的影响,然后表明其实蒯因所抨击的分析性与卡尔纳普所支持的分析性是两类不同的语言学概念——用蒯因的术语说——作为超越的概念的分析性与作为内在的概念的分析性。最后指出,蒯因后来也接纳了分析性,而且按照他的观点,其分析性也是一个内在的概念。 This paper first comments on and analyzes Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity,pointing out that Carnap agrees largely about the theses in Quine's criticism of analyticity but denies that they tell against the concept of analyticity,and then indicates that the analyticity attacked by Quine and the one supported by Carnap are in fact two kinds of linguistic concepts——in Quine's terms——the analyticity as a transcendent concept and the one as an immanent concept.Finally,I point out that later Quine accepts analyticity and his analyticity is also an immanent concept according to his view.

关 键 词： 分析性 蒯因 卡尔纳普 先验性 意义公设

领　　域： [自然科学总论]