机构地区: 中山大学
出 处: 《经济学(季刊)》 2010年第1期597-608,共12页
摘 要: 本文通过构建一个双寡头垄断竞争的博弈模型,探讨了存在产品差异的混合寡头市场(mixed oligopoly)中,国内外企业的产品差异程度和公有企业私有化程度对最优关税的影响。研究结果表明:无论政府以收入极大化还是福利极大化为目标,其制定的关税税率都应随着私有化程度和产品差异程度的提高而提高,政府福利目标与关税收入目标都与产品差异程度成正比。与最近的其他研究发现不同,在不存在私有化或者当私有化程度相对较低而差异程度相对较高时,收入极大化关税税率总是高于福利极大化关税税率。同时本文还得出,福利极大化下的社会最优私有化比例总是大于关税收入极大化的社会最优私有化比例。因此,以社会福利极大化为目标的政府比以关税收入极大化为目标的政府更加倾向于私有化本国的公有企业。 This paper investigates the effects of partial privatization and product differentiation on the optimal tariff in an international mixed duopoly. We demonstrate that the optimal tariff increases either as the degree of partial privatization or the degree of product differentiation increases and equilibrium government's objectives increase as degree of product differentiation increases, In contrast to recent studies, the maximum revenue tariff exceeds the optimum welfare tariff when the partial privatization ratio is relatively low but the degree of product differentiation is relatively high. Finally, the optimal partial privatization ratio in maximum-revenue case is always higher than that in optimum-welfare case.
领 域: [经济管理]