作　　者： ; ; ; ;

机构地区： 中华人民共和国环境保护部

出　　处： 《环境保护科学》 2010年第1期37-40,44,共5页

摘　　要： 利用进化博弈的复制动态方法,建立流域生态补偿的进化博弈模型,研究利益相关者基于利益因素的动态博弈特征。结果表明,在上下游的"环境责任协议"制度中引入激励机制—监督惩罚成本后,流域生态补偿机制中的利益相关者最终进化成哪种策略取决于对下游地区补偿不能及时到位的行为的惩罚力度(即监督惩罚成本的大小)、下游地区对上游地区的生态补偿量以及上游因损害生态资源而给下游地区的赔偿量。通过调整这三个关键因素,可促使(保护,补偿)成为纳什均衡,从而有效地激励人们从事生态投资并保持这种投资的持续性,实现流域生态环境的可持续发展。 The characteristics of the dynamic game among stakeholders acting in its self- interest in river basin ecological compensation mechanism are analyzed using the evolutionary game theory. A detailed analysis shows that by introducing incentive mechanism into environmental responsibility protocol for river basin, evolutionarily stable strategy is determined by punishment cost, compensation quantity of the lower reaches to the upper reaches and compensation quantity of the upper reaches to the lower reaches. As long as these controllable variables are adjusted in order to meet Nash Equilibrium, it can motivate people to engage in ecological investment and maintain the sustainability of this investment, thus to realize sustainable development of basin ecological environment.

关 键 词： 流域生态补偿 利益相关 进化博弈 复制动态 进化稳定策略

领　　域： [环境科学与工程] [水利工程]