作　　者： ; (易翠）;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《当代经济管理》 2010年第2期20-25,共6页

摘　　要： 从研发投入风险和决策者风险偏爱出发,以委托代理理论为框架,分析高管持股对企业R&D投入的影响。研究结果显示:股东比管理者更愿意进行R&D投入,高管持股对企业R&D投入有激励作用,但这种激励在持股比例很低时不显著,只有当高管持股达到0.1%时,R&D投入强度才显著提高。这说明对高风险的研发投入,只有那些与企业长远发展相关的利益群体,首先是股东,其次是持股达到一定比例的高管才有动机加大R&D投入,促进企业的创新。 From the viewpoints of R＆D investment risk and risk preference of decision-makers and based on agency theory, this paper analyzes the impact of executive shareholders on enterprises＇ R＆D investment. The study reveals that shareholders are more enthusiastic in R＆D investment than managers and executive shareholders have incentive influence on enterprises＇ investment in R＆D. However, only when the ratio of their share reaches 0.1%, R＆D investment is obviously enlarged, otherwise the influence is less obvious, which indicates that high risk R＆D investment has much more to do with interest groups who care about long-term development of enterprises; namely, shareholders, followed by the executive shareholders whose holding ratio has reached certain point, have motivation to increase R＆D investment, prompting enterprises

关 键 词： 投入 风险偏爱 高管持股 股权激励 股权集中度

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]