作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 暨南大学经济学院

出　　处： 《南方金融》 2009年第12期71-74,共4页

摘　　要： 理论界关于声誉机制对证券分析师利益冲突行为的影响存在两种截然不同的观点,本文通过构建证券分析师不同情况下的收益矩阵,求解其最大化的期望收益,得出了声誉机制会引发证券分析师的利益冲突行为,而且证券分析师是否选择跟风主要取决于不同情况下的收益的结论。本文认为,可通过建立声誉回报机制来影响证券分析师的收益,促使证券分析师发布独立且公正的投资建议,以消除证券分析师的利益冲突行为。 There are two distinct views of reputation mechanisms for analysts＇ conflicts of interest among the academic circle. This paper concludes that the reputation mechanism will lead to analysts＇ conflicts of interest and whether analysts choose following depends on different earnings under different circumstances by constructing the payoff matrix and maximizing their expected profits. This paper argues that we can establish a reputation return mechanism to influence analysts＇ gains, urge analysts to publish independent and impartial investment advice so as to eliminate analysts＇ conflicts of interest.

关 键 词： 证券分析师 声誉机制 利益冲突 跟风 监管

领　　域： [经济管理]