作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 南开大学商学院会计学系

出　　处： 《金融研究》 2009年第11期143-157,共15页

摘　　要： 本文从三个方面对我国上市公司高管(含董事、监事和高层管理者)的短线交易行为进行了研究:(1)上市公司高管的短线交易能获得超额收益吗?(2)不同职位的高管获得的收益具有差别吗?(3)高管为短线交易行为提出的辩解理由是真实的吗?基于上交所和深交所的数据,本文的经验研究发现:整体而言,上市公司高管的短线交易行为能获得超额收益;尤其是监事的短线交易行为更多、"择时"能力更强;未说明原因的短线交易行为(即默认故意实施的短线交易)与"对相关规定不了解"这两种具有主观意图的短线交易都能获得超额收益,而"误操作"导致的短线交易平均而言未能获得超额收益,这意味着高管提出的辩解理由整体而言是真实的。 focusing on short swing trading of insiders including directors, supervisors and senior managers, this paper examines three questions： can swing trading of insiders gain abnormal return？ Does the abnormal return vary with insider＇s position？ Are the explanations of insiders for their short swing trading the truth？ With the da- ta from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, this empirical study finds that swing trading of insiders gain abnormal return in general; supervisors have more short swing trading and more powerful ability of timing than other insiders; and that short swing trading without claimed explanalions gain more signifieant abnomal returnand have more powerful ability of timing while other trading with claimed explanations （ such as incorrect manipulation or unfamiliar with regulations） have no abnormal return, which indicates that the explanations of insiders for their short swing trading are generally the truth.

关 键 词： 内部人交易 短线交易 择时

领　　域： [文化科学]