作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中南大学公共政策与地方治理研究中心

出　　处： 《中国农村观察》 2009年第6期62-71,共10页

摘　　要： 村庄公共决策是一个非契约化和完全信息状态下的迭演博弈过程,是当前村庄政治演化的活动场域。毫无疑问,理性有序的村庄公共选择建构着健康和谐的地方治理秩序。本文运用博弈理论、公共选择理论及剧场政治理论,探究"一事一议"场景下和压力型公共决策模式中的村庄集体行动逻辑。湘南村庄"一事一议"的案例启示,在受到非正式规则及其约束的乡村集体行动中,由于乡村干部在规则提供与空间控制中的主导地位,处于被动地位的村民的利益诉求表现出一种策略性表达和认可的行为倾向。同时,在存在利益分歧的村庄完全信息迭演博弈的场域中,人们的公共选择行动出现了与布坎南所论述的"一致同意"意义不同的"一致通过"的结果,村庄公共决策实质处于一种行政主导和精英控制的逆选择状态。 Rural public decision-making is a persistent game under the state of Non-contractual and complete information,and also an action-field of village politics' evolution.There is no doubt that rational and ordered rural public choice can construct healthy and harmonious rules of local governance.According to the game theory,the public choice theory and the theater politics theory,the paper studies the village's logic of collective action under 'one case one meeting' scene and pressure-type public decision-making mode.The example of a village's 'one case one meeting' in south Hunan give us an enlightenment that under the village's logic of collective action which is constrained by the informal rules,because of township leading cadres' leading position in rules providing and space controlling,the peasants who are placed in a passive position apt to express their appeals in a strategic way and to give recognition.At the same time,on the different-benefit villages' complete information game field,peasants' public choice action lead to the result of 'unanimous pass' which is distinguishes from Buchanan's 'unanimous consent'.Actually rural public decision-making was in an administrative-oriented and elite controlled adverse selection state.

关 键 词： 迭演博弈 策略行动 一事 议 公共决策

领　　域： [经济管理] [政治法律] [政治法律]