作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华南师范大学政治与行政学院

出　　处： 《中国行政管理》 2009年第10期25-29,共5页

摘　　要： 本文以关系合约为切入点,运用交易费用的相关理论,对我国食品安全监管部门间合作困境的机理进行探究,认为导致部门间合作困境的重要因素有:部门对"领域的极端敏感性"与合作之间的内在紧张关系;部门边界的模糊性为机会主义行为提供的体制可能性;监管"团队生产"的特性导致上级运用等级权威进行有效控制的困难;被普遍认可的协商机制的缺乏;部门间成本收益分配的不对等。要突破监管部门间合作的困境,实现各监管环节的无缝衔接,关键在于设计一个有效的食品安全治理结构,以减少治理主体之间合作的交易费用。 In the perspective of relational contract, this thesis attempts to take advantage of transaction cost theories to discover the mechanism of cooperation dilemma in the food safety regulation. It is argued in this thesis that, the internal contradiction between ＂the extreme sensitiveness to territory＂ of administrative departments and cooperation; the institutional possibility for the opportunism behaviors stemmed from the overlapping of department boundaries; the difficulty for the superior levels to control effectively by the hierarchical authority due to the ＂team production＂ feature of regulation; the lack of pervasively recognized negotiation mechanism; the disparity of cost - benefit distribution among diverse regulation departments, all these are causes resulting the cooperation dilemma among regulation departments. For the purpose to figure out such a dilemma, realize seamless juncture among various regulation parts, the crucial point is＂ to design a effective food safety governance structure, which could decrease the transaction among regulation departments.

关 键 词： 食品安全监管 部门间合作 困境 关系合约

领　　域： [政治法律]