作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 暨南大学

出　　处： 《中国地质大学学报（社会科学版）》 2009年第5期85-88,共4页

摘　　要： 代理理论由于工具自身的限制,往往将控制性家族隐含假设为一个"黑箱",难以从根本上解决家族企业治理问题。本文在导入利他主义理论的基础上,结合利他主义和代理理论分析比较控制性家族内外形成的四种代理冲突。重点剖析家族经理人与家族成员、家族企业创始人与有继承权的子女之间由于不对称利他所引发的代理冲突,并指出进一步的研究方向。 Limited by its background, agency theory assumes the controlling family as a ＂black box＂, which is difficult to solve fundamentally the issue of family business governance. Based on the theory of altruism and by combining it with agency theory, this paper analyzes and compares four kinds of agency conflict both within and outside the controlling family. The focus is put on the agency conflicts caused by asymmetric altruism between family managers and family members, and between family business founders and inheritance successors. Finally, further research directions are suggested.

关 键 词： 代理冲突 利他 家族企业

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]