作　　者： ; ; ; ;

机构地区： 中国人民大学财政金融学院

出　　处： 《经济研究》 2009年第7期55-64,共10页

摘　　要： 本文首先在一般理论框架下考察了通货膨胀的决定因素,发现通货膨胀依赖中央银行和私人部门各自对经济冲击的预测。然后基于信息不对称性研究了货币政策透明度与反通货膨胀之间的关系,发现提高货币政策透明度不仅有利于减小通货膨胀偏差,而且会降低通货膨胀波动。经验研究结果表明,在我国货币政策透明度提高的初期,反通胀期内的牺牲率明显地高于透明度提高后的反通胀期内的牺牲率,这意味着我国20世纪90年代后期以来牺牲率较低的一个重要原因可能是货币政策透明度的逐步提高。 Based on a general theoretical framework, this paper first considers the deterministic factors of inflation, finds that the inflation depends on the forecasts from both central bank and private sector. Then assuming the existence of asymmetric information, we find that the improvement of monetary policy transparency will not only decrease the inflation bias, but also diminish the degree of fluctuation of inflation. Based on China＇s data, the empirical result shows that the sacrifice ratio in the first period of improving transparency during disinflation episodes is significantly higher than that of transparency improved, which implies that the low sacrifice ratio during the late 1990s in China was highly due to the improvement of monetary policy transparency.

关 键 词： 货币政策透明度 反通货膨胀 牺牲率

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]