作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学

出　　处： 《广州大学学报（社会科学版）》 2009年第6期3-8,共6页

摘　　要： 经济学理论认为,政府官员同样扮演着经济人的角色,在特定的制度约束下寻求自身利益最大化,这是诱致腐败的心理基础。如果制度存在缺陷,使腐败活动的收益超过其成本,腐败自然趋于泛滥。本文构建了政府官员腐败的成本—收益模型,指出腐败的收益包括物质和精神两方面,腐败成本则包括预备成本、实施成本和风险成本,具体分析了贿赂型腐败和贪污型腐败中政府官员的行为选择。在此基础上,认为腐败的关键在于制度缺陷,必须严格地对约束个人活动的不同制度环境进行比较,将廉政研究的重点转移到制度上来。 It is identified in economic theories that public officials are the rational and self-interested actors who try to maximize their own benefits, which is conceived as the psychological foundation of corruption. It is assumed that the public officials make decisions by comparing the costs and benefits of different courses of actions. In this regard, corruption may inevitably arise among public officials when the corrupt actions generate more benefits than costs under the incomplete system. This article tries to construct a cost-benefit model of public officials＇ corruption and indicates that the benefits of corruption include the physical and spiritual aspects. On the other hand, the costs of corruption include costs of preparation, implementation and risk. The behavior choices of public officials in both direct corruption and indirect bribery corruption are also specifically analyzed and the conclusion is drawn that the key to anti-corruption and clean government is based on systematic problems after comparing the individual be haviors under different systems.

关 键 词： 公共选择 经济人假设 政治腐败 廉政建设

领　　域： [政治法律] [政治法律]