作　　者： ;

机构地区： 广东商学院金融学院

出　　处： 《湘潭大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》 2009年第3期65-68,共4页

摘　　要： 在成熟的经理人市场上,经理人的经营业绩将会对其未来的市场价值产生一个正的信号,而损害委托人利益的行为将产生负的信号,不利于其未来价值的积累。这一信号对经理人的行为将起到有效约束作用。中国经济正处于转型时期,各种市场约束机制并没有得到建立和健全,中国应加大经理人市场的建设力度,对职业经理人的选择应逐步以市场选择代替行政任命,同时要建立起一套客观有效的评价体系,使真正优秀的、有责任感的企业家脱颖而出。 In a well - established managerg market, management performance of the manager will become a positive signal of futuristic value, but the actions which harm the clientg interests will be a negative signal unfavorable for the accumulation of values for the fu- ture. The signal will effectively restrict the manager＇s actions. Chinese economy is in a transitional period, when various kinds of mechanisms of restrictions of the market havent fully been set up. It＇s urgent to reinforce the construction of the manager＇s market in China, where the selection of professional managers should gradually resort to the choice decided by market rather than administrative means, and at the same time a set of objective and effective evaluative system should be established to favor really outstanding and responsible entrepreneurs.

关 键 词： 经理人市场 激励约束 隐性激励

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]