作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华中科技大学公共管理学院

出　　处： 《华中科技大学学报（社会科学版）》 2009年第2期89-94,共6页

摘　　要： 农民合作问题是当前三农研究的热点。在存在共同利益的条件下农民之间依然会选择不合作,这充分说明还存在其他有待研究的合作条件。理论研究和现实观察发现惩罚可以视为合作条件之一,那么在农村公共产品供给过程中惩罚是为何存在和如何实施的命题就必须给出回答。在采用实地访谈的调查方法结合案例分析后,探讨农民合作行为中的惩罚机制。惩罚的存在一方面体现了合作者对于搭便车者自发的负面情感,另一方面它可以修正搭便车者的成本和收益从而增加合作的可能性。惩罚的有效实施依赖于强互惠者和权威力量等惩罚实施主体。惩罚在实施过程中不仅表现为直接惩罚,更多地是在社会交换网络中实现的间接惩罚。 Peasant cooperation in China is one of the hot issues to both the government and the academic circles. But there are still a lot of non-cooperative behaviors among peasants even if there are common interests. This fact means that there are other cooperative conditions that need to be studied. Previous theories show that punishment can serve as one of the cooperation conditions. Then the questions must be answered that how punishment exists and how it should be implemented in the provision process of rural public goods. The paper investigates punishment mechanism in the cooperative behaviors of peasants by means of on-the-spot in- vestigations and case studies. The results show that punishment not only reflects the cooperators＇ negative emotions towards the free rider but also it can amend the cost and benefit of the free rider in order to promote the possibility for cooperation. The amendment of yield function needs to amend the punished cost of no coop- eration yield, which depends on the enforcement of punishment mechanism. And the effective implement of punishment depends on authority and strong reciprocator as the implementing subject. The way of punishment sometimes is direct and sometimes indirect in the social exchange networks.

关 键 词： 合作条件 惩罚机制 强互惠 权威

领　　域： [经济管理]