作　　者： ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《当代经济管理》 2008年第12期28-37,共10页

摘　　要： 本课题采用理论、实证、问卷和实地调查,从不同角度研究了我国制度背景下的"超强控制"、"超弱控制"、大股东异化、中小股东边缘化现象;独立董事任职的动机、最担心的风险、有效发挥作用的条件与前提、薪酬待遇、辞职原因等。得到的主要研究结论有:我国独立董事制度中的租金较高,具有设租效应、花瓶效应、决策效应、风险回避效应、寻租效应和动机冲突效应;知识型花瓶式有威慑作用的独立董事是达成各方利益平衡的现实定位;独立董事对透明信息的感知力强,导致报酬与风险的有效性;辞职的关键与独立董事感知到的风险相关,与报酬无显著关系;独立董事对关联交易有显著的抑制作用,但对大股东资金占用、担保和变更募集资金投向的作用不显著。依据这些结论,提出了政策建议。 The project explores plenty of phenomena occurred under Chinese national background, such as super-strong control, superweak controlled, largest shareholder＇ s alienation, middle-smafi shareholder＇ s edgerization; motivations, mostly-cared risks, effectively-role prerequisite, effectively-cost compensation and resignation drivers for independent directors using field investigations, theoretical and empirical studies, institutional mechanisms and normative theories. The main conclusion includes that empirical tests significally shows the effects about rents setting, vase showing, decision making, risk avoiding, rent seeking, motive conflicting, with higher rents in systems; knowledgetype, vase-style and deterrent-action roles are real functions and positions for independent directors; key reasons for resignation are significantly related to information perceived by independent directors, but insignificantly to compensations; independent directors have deterrents to associated transactions significantly, without great influences on encroachment and decisions of guarantee and changing fund usage made by largest shareholders. Finllly some suggestions are proposed based on these conclusions.

关 键 词： 董事制度 独立董事 董事作用 董事角色 董事会

领　　域： [经济管理]