作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 云南财经大学会计学院

出　　处： 《昆明大学学报》 2008年第2期92-96,共5页

摘　　要： 随着家族上市公司的不断出现,新的"一股独大"的问题也开始显现出来。论文基于近年来家族上市公司对中小股东剥削侵害的现实,选取了家族控制的上市公司作为样本,在"双重委托代理理论"和公司治理的基本理论支撑下,对我国家族上市公司的公司治理问题进行了理论分析,并提出政策建议:在中国未来的证券市场改革过程中,要健全市场监管机制和外部治理机制,加大家族违规的成本和惩处力度,压制其投机心理,保护中小股东利益;进一步完善职业经理人制度,加强和完善家族上市公司董事会治理机制,促进我国家族企业长期、健康发展。 As family-controlled listed company increases rapidly, the new problem ＂one share big alone＂ has also begun to arise. Based on the reality that family-controlled listed company exploits and violates the minority stockholders in recent years, this paper uses the theory of dual agency relationship and the basic theories of compa- ny＇s governance, carries on the theoretical analysis study of family-controlled listed company. It tries to make some suggestions based on the above results of theoretical analysis. In the prospective process of our security market＇s reform, it is necessary to perfect the market supervision mechanism and external governance mechanism, at the same time, increase the cost of family deregulation, intensify its punishment and suppress their opportunistic psychology. Therefore, minority stockholders＇ benefit can be protected. Fur thermore we suggest perfecting the system of professional manager, directorate governance mechanism of family-controlled listed company, and promoting our familycontrolled listed company＇s development incessantly and healthily.

关 键 词： 家族企业 公司治理

领　　域： [经济管理]