作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《中国工业经济》 2008年第5期109-119,共11页

摘　　要： 本文以非上市家族企业为样本,探讨职业经理人治理模式对家族企业决策质量的影响。本文验证了和经营业绩一样,职业经理人持股与战略绩效也不存在直接关系,并提供了一条新的思路,探讨职业经理人持股如何通过引起家族成员不公平感,而对家族企业决策质量产生影响。数据分析结果表明,职业经理人持股作为西方广为提倡的家族企业治理模式,在中国情境下与家族企业决策质量并无直接关系。相反可能因为导致家族成员产生的不公平感,从而降低家族成员决策承诺,进一步影响家族企业的决策质量。最后,我们通过实证得出结论,在中国现有情境下,通过泛家族化建立了一定的信任基础之后,再将股权向职业经理人进行合理配置,应该是较为理想的途径。 This paper takes non-listed family firms as samples to test the irrelevant relationship between external ESOP and strategy performance in family enterprises. Moreover, authors point out a new way to discuss this issue, which is through fairness problem of family firms to test how ESOP affects strategy decision making. The result of empirical test shows, ESOP does not have direct influence on decision quality of family firms. On the contrary, external ESOP makes family employee feel unfair, which caused lower decision commitment and reduced the strategy decision quality. Finally, we point out a better way to govern professional managers to fit Chinese situation that is giving professional managers share of the family firm after constructing ＂trust＂ by pan-familized.

关 键 词： 家族企业 关系治理 契约治理 公平治理

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]