作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 北京大学光华管理学院

出　　处： 《南开管理评论》 2008年第2期22-27,共6页

摘　　要： 本文利用581家中国上市公司数据,实证检验了会计信息透明度对董事会规模和独立性的影响。研究结果表明,会计信息透明度是公司的一个独特特征,董事会规模与会计信息透明度显著正相关,外部董事比例与会计信息透明度没有显著相关性。而在非国有控股公司中,会计信息透明度对董事会规模没有显著影响。这些证据表明,只有在国有控股公司中,会计信息透明度才能具有治理作用,影响董事会规模。 Using data of 581 Chinese publicly listed companies, the paper empirically tests the impacts of accounting information transparency on corporate board size and independence. First, the research findings suggest that accounting information transparency is a unique characteristic of company, and firm size, growth, uncer- tainty, listed age and post performance just explain a small part of the variance of accounting information transparency; second, the paper finds that accounting information transparency is significantly positively related to board size, but not significantly related to board independency; finally, there is significant relationship between accounting information transparency and board size in state-owned firms, but in non-state-owned firms, there is no significant relationship between accounting information transparency and board size. These evidences suggest that the difference of relationship between board size and board independence of state-owned firms and non- state-owned firms is significantly different. For the non-state-owned firms, accounting information can not play an important governance role, but for state-owned firms, accounting information transparency can act as a governance role and have positive effect on board size. Because of information asymmetry between shareholders and managers in state-owned firms, shareholders decide the degree of information asymmetry according to accounting information transparency, if the quality of accounting information transparency is low, shareholders will think that the degree of information asymmetry is high, and should strengthen monitoring managers adjusting the size and composition of board. That shows the governance role of accounting information transparency. But for non-state-owned firms, the largest shareholders are executive managers, and there is no significant information asymmetry between them, so the shareholders do not depend on accounting information transparency to adjust the board size and independency to improve the monitoring ab

关 键 词： 会计信息透明度 董事会规模 董事会独立性 治理作用

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理] [经济管理]