作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华南农业大学经济管理学院

出　　处： 《金融理论与实践》 2008年第4期9-13,共5页

摘　　要： 商业银行特殊性理论表明,较低的透明度使银行风险资产具有较大模糊性。这使银行债权人和股东面临着更为严重的道德风险问题。公开交易的信息揭示功能可缓解信息不对称问题。伴随着银行公开交易而产生的控制权市场和经理人市场对银行经理所造成的竞争压力亦可缓解道德风险;它也为银行设计股票和股权等绩效状态依存的长期激励机制提供了方便。为进一步发挥公开交易的约束功能,需要完善透明度监管,建立控制权市场和经理人市场。 just as the declaration of the theory of bank uniqueness, banking assets such as loans lack transparency are not unusually opaque. Therefore, compared with the non-financial sector, the creditor and the shareholder of banks encounter more moral hazard problem and the opportunism for banking managers. The agency friction can be mitigated by going public. By doing so, the problem can also be abated by the competition from the takeover market and the managers market. Moreover, it is necessary to devise a equity-based compensation system for the banking managers after going public. According to the conclusion, the State-Owned Banks in China can also acquire the earning from going public.

关 键 词： 商业银行特殊性理论 公开交易 信息不对称 道德风险 国有银行

领　　域： [经济管理]