作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 华南农业大学

出　　处： 《河南师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》 2008年第2期44-47,共4页

摘　　要： 知识论领域长久以来广泛讨论的主题是,是否存在像"所与"这样的东西。刘易斯等基础主义者都认为存在"所与"这样的东西,而且它在基础知识论中起重要作用。尽管在基础主义内部关于"所与"的表述形式各异,但核心思想都是把基础信念看做是作为材料"所与"我们的,因此我们一般把基础主义的这一理论称为"所与论"。然而,我们的重点不在所与论的差异而在于它们之间的共同点,为此,我们要先阐明一些有代表性的哲学家关于所与的观点,再进一步讨论所与在经验主义知识论中究竟有何作用。 One central theme of epistemological discussion has been a widespread doubt whether there is any such thing as the Given. Lewis and other people have thought that there is the Given and it can play foundational epistemological role. Whereas the expression of ＂the Given＂ is varied, they all looked upon basic belief as data ＂given to＂ us. Thereby the theory is usually described as ＂the theory of the Given＂. Our emphasis isn＇t their difference, but lies in common ground. Therefore, we had better clarify viewpoint of the Given that many representative philosophers hold, and then discuss what role the Given is playing in experiential epistemology.

关 键 词： 所与 基础主义 感觉材料 确证

领　　域： [文化科学] [语言文字]