作　　者： ;

机构地区： 暨南大学管理学院

出　　处： 《预测》 2008年第2期62-67,共6页

摘　　要： 考虑了两家企业1和2,其中仅企业1雇用企业管理者管理企业,企业2的所有者就是企业管理者。运用博弈论研究网络外部效应下企业管理者的激励问题。研究表明,当网络外部性满足一定的条件时,随着产品间相关性的变化,激励参数的改变对企业1和企业2的产量和价格决策将造成不同的影响。网络外部效应、产品间的相关性以及单位成本的改变将影响最优激励参数。其中,网络外部效应越大,则最优激励参数越小。网络外部性总是提高均衡产量和利润,而均衡价格可能提高、减少或保持不变。网络外部性还将进一步加大由于企业管理者决策目标不相同所带来的企业之间的均衡产量、价格和利润差距。 Two enterprises named 1 and 2 are considered in this paper and only enterprise 1 employ manager, enterprise 2＇s owner is manager of enterprise 2, and manager＇ s incentive is studied under the condition of net work externality used by game theory. The results show that, when the net work externality reach a certain condition, the change of incentive has an effect on enterprise 1 and enterprise 2 s＇ production and price. The change of net work externality, the complement and substitution of products and unit cost will affect optimal incentive. The larger net work externality, the smaller optimal incentive, and net work externality always increase production and profit, but price may be decreased, increased or holden the line. Net work externality also increases the gap of price, production and profit between enterprise 1 and 2 caused by the difference of manager＇ s object.

关 键 词： 网络外部性 激励 博弈 库诺特竞争

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]