作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

出　　处： 《金融研究》 2008年第1期163-174,共12页

摘　　要： 现有文献往往都不对政府隐性保险的操作实践进行任何的区分,未能考察不同隐性保险方式对不同银行风险承担行为的不同作用机理。本文在一个两期经济的框架内,比较研究了不完全隐性保险和完全隐性保险的政策效果与环境依赖,研究了不完全隐性保险对银行业风险承担行为的影响,给出了不完全隐性保险对不同银行风险选择的激励条件和边界。不完全隐性保险对健康银行的风险选择具有"屏蔽效应";在一定的条件下,不完全隐性保险能降低问题银行的风险承担激励,但其效果取决于受保险的消费者类型和实体经济的微观基础。当银行业现有的风险承担倾向较高时,政府不完全的隐性保险政策要优于完全的隐性保险政策。 The existing literatures concerning on implicit deposit insurance usually don＇t make any differences for the practice of implicit insurance by government and don＇t investigate the different mechanisms of different styles of implicit deposit insurance for different risk-taking banks. The paper comparatively studies the policy effects of fully implicit insurance and partially implicit insurance, and the effects of partially implicit insurance on risk-taking behaviors of baking at a two-stage economy. The partially implicit insurance policy doesn＇t necessary induces the risk-taking incentives of all banks, but indeed can reduce the wholly risk-taking incentives of unhealthy banks under certain condition. Whether partially implicit insurance reduces the risk-taking incentive of bank or not depends on the styles of consumer and micro-foundation of real economy. The partially implicit insurance policy is superior to the fully implicit insurance policy when the current risk-taking propensity of unhealthy banks is high.

关 键 词： 不完全隐性保险 市场约束 风险承担行为 问题银行

领　　域： [社会学] [政治法律] [政治法律]