作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《当代经济管理》 2007年第4期98-103,共6页

摘　　要： 与伯利和米恩斯所强调的上市公司面临所有权与经营权分离不同,现代企业的股权相当集中,普遍存在着掌握公司控制权的大股东,由此产生了大股东对中小股东的掠夺行为。这一问题在国有上市公司中普遍存在且相当严重。由于它不同于传统的委托-代理问题,既有的公司治理机制无法有效解决这一问题,因此有必要对其进行完善和补充。 In contrast to what Berle and Means said about the listed corporation confronted with the separation of the ownership and control rights, the modern enterprise has a concentrated equity ownership structure and the large shareholders with the control rights. So there exists the expropriation of large shareholders from other shareholders, which is common and serious in the state-owned listed corporations. Because it＇s different from the traditional principle-agent, the existing mechanisms of corporate governance can＇t resolve it effectively. Therefore, it is necessary to improve and reinforce the existing mechanisms.

关 键 词： 大股东 掠夺 国有上市公司 治理机制

领　　域： [经济管理]