作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《经济经纬》 2007年第3期81-84,共4页

摘　　要： 企业的功能不仅在于节约要素(中间品)交易成本,是要素的“间接定价装置”,还在于节约最终产品交易成本。信息不对称的产品市场上,企业在交易中“制造”了一个重复博弈机制,这使其更关心长远利益。它用自身专用性资产——从价值和数量两个维度——来作为其产品是合格品的担保。专用性资产单位价值越大,数量越多,企业越有谋求长远利益、放弃短期机会主义行为的激励。市场上理性的买方考虑到这一点,总是认为效益越好、规模越大的企业越有可能提供合格品。企业是信用的载体,它一定程度上避免了产品市场由于信息不对称所引致的逆向选择,从而节约最终产品交易成本。我们的分析补充和完善了企业的交易成本理论。 The function of enterprises is not only saving medium products＇ transaction cost and being ＂the device to fix price indirectly＂, but also saving the transaction cost of finished products. In product market with information asymmetry, enterprises make a machanism for repetitive Games in transaction, which makes them care more about long - term benefits. They use specific asserts - from the two dimensions of value and quantity - to assure that their products are qualified. The more the unit value of special asserts and the more quantity it gives, the more incentive enterprises will have to pursue long - term benefits and give up opportunist short - term benefits. When the rational buyers consider this, they will think that those enterprises with better benefits and bigger size are more likely to provide qualified products. Enterprises are credit carriers, which avoid to a certain degree adverse choice in product market caused by information asymmetry and save the transaction cost of finished. The author＇s analysis complement and perfect the theory about transaction cost of enterprises.

关 键 词： 企业理论 专用性资产 信息不对称 交易成本

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]