作　　者： ; ; (叶康涛）;

机构地区： UniversityofNorthCarolinaUSA

出　　处： 《经济研究》 2007年第4期101-111,共11页

摘　　要： 本文以大股东占用上市公司资金作为研究对象,考察了在中国证券市场上,独立董事的引入能否有效抑制大股东的掏空行为。与以往研究类似,在OLS回归中,我们未能发现独立董事比例与大股东资金占用之间存在显著相关关系。进一步分析表明,中国上市公司的独立董事变量具有内生性,在控制独立董事内生性情况下,我们发现独立董事变量与大股东资金占用显著负相关。这表明以往研究未能发现独立董事能够抑制大股东掏空,很可能源于模型设定偏误。在稳健性分析部分,我们采用了多种指标来反映大股东的资金占用行为,本文结论仍然成立。 We examine the impacts of independent directors on the tunneling of large shareholders in China＇s stock market. Specifically, we study whether independent directors can reduce the fund embezzlement of large shareholders from the listed companies. Similar to previous literature, we do not find the significant relation between the percentage of independent directors and the fund embezzlement of large shareholders in OLS regressions. Further analyses demonstrate, however, the percentage of independent directors is an endogenous variable. After controlling the endogeneity issue, the percentage of independent directors is negatively related to the fund embezzlement of large shareholders, implying that the previous research which do not find the negative relation between independent directors and tunneling may be subject to model misspeeifieation. Our conclusions are robust to various proxies for the fund embezzlement of large shareholders.

关 键 词： 掏空 独立董事 抑制

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]