作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 华南农业大学经济管理学院

出　　处： 《河南金融管理干部学院学报》 2007年第2期61-68,共8页

摘　　要： 构建简单动态模型分析国有上市银行地区(部门)经理的长期激励机制设计问题。模型揭示了颇有意思的含义。企业家才能是银行长期发展的基本诱因。就绩效评估而言,EVA有利于经理做出即期最优投资决策,RA-ROC有利于银行长期发展。固定报酬合约将诱发地区经理的冒险行为,使贷款超过最优水平;随机支付合约或EVA状态依存支付合约将使总行实现最优贷款规模。EVA为零时,撤销机构、收回贷款权等,可减少当前风险,但使银行失去潜在投资机会。静态看,解雇经理未必获得预期效果;动态看,解雇威胁具有威慑作用,能迫使经理努力工作,增加股东价值。 A simple dynamic model is to be set up for an analysis on problerm of the region （department） managers＇ long - term incentive mechanism of state - owned listed banks. The model discloses the following meaningful implication. Entrepreneurs are the essential inducement for banking development. As far as performance assessment is concerned, EVA will be beneficial for the managers to make prompt, optimized investment decision; RAROC will be beneficial for bank＇s long development. Fixed return contracts will induce venture behavior of regional managers, making loan exceed optimized level; random payment contracts, or EVA state -reliance contracts will make the head office realize optimized loan size. When EVA is zero, removing institutions, recalling loan -granting power, etc. can reduce the present risks, but will make bank miss potential investment chances. Viewed statically, dismissal of managers will not necessarily have expected effect; while viewed dynamically, dismissal threat, with a threatening function, can force managers to work hard and add shareholder value.

关 键 词： 信息不对称 代理冲突 股东价值最大化 经理长期激励机制 企业家能力

领　　域： [经济管理]