作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 青岛大学国际商学院

出　　处： 《浙江理工大学学报（自然科学版）》 2007年第1期102-106,共5页

摘　　要： 由于在信息不对称情形下,总部管理者必须依赖自利的部门管理者提供关于项目利润的私人信息,在审核成本很高,无法验证分部管理者的类型时,基于信息租金与投资终止成本的权衡,总部管理者会选择一个投资终止的最优机制,以达到总部管理者净利润最大。 In realistic capital budgeting, headquarters should cause the net present value rule does not accord with the realistic not naively apply the net present value rule, becapital budgeting that characterize with information asymmetry. Due to the information asymmetry, headquarters must depend on the report of self-interested division managers with private information about the project profit. So, if there is a high audit cost and no possibility of verifying the state of division managers, based on the trade off between information rents and cost of termination of investment, the headquarters usually exert optimal mechanism of termination of investment to maximize the headquarters＇ net profit.

关 键 词： 资本预算 信息租金 投资终止 配置效率 激励相容约束

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]