机构地区: 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
出 处: 《南开管理评论》 2006年第6期39-44,共6页
摘 要: 本文以我国资本市场上1998-2001年四年内被实施ST的全部上市公司为样本,实证考察了地方政府和控股股东通过实施频繁的资产重组对ST公司的支持行为,旨在找到ST公司成功摘帽的决定因素,以及“摘帽”能否说明公司价值真正得到了提高。结果表明,重组次数更多、重组规模更大的公司摘帽的可能性更大,进行了资产置换的公司摘帽的机率明显增加,盈利能力更差、负债更严重的公司摘帽的机会更小。无论成功摘帽与否,ST公司的盈利能力并未得到实质性改进,“支持性重组”本质上只是一种机会主义行为。 This paper investigates all Chinese listed corporations which were special treated during 1998 to 2001, and researches local governments and controlling shareholders' propping behavior through leading frequent restructuring. The target is to find the determinants of "uncap" and whether it means firm value had been improved virtually. The results reveal that more frequent and larger scale restructuring means more probability to "uncap", and asset replacement leads to more chance to cancel the special treatment. At the same time, poorer earning capability and more severe debt burden represent less chance to remove its ST label. But whether uncaps or not, the ST corporations hadn't practically improved their profitability and the " propping restructuring" is essentially opportunistic.