作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 陕西师范大学

出　　处： 《商业经济与管理》 2006年第12期37-41,70,共6页

摘　　要： 银行和借款者之间信息不对称的降低,很大程度上要受益于银行间的信用信息共享机制。文章通过信用信息共享抉择模型分析我国银行间信用信息共享与合作动力机制,得出在目前信贷市场结构下,各银行对信用信息共享程度的期望值不同,而公共机关强制的信息共享可能对银行的行为产生游离或参与两种截然不同的效用。因此,必须建立有效的信用信息共享激励和约束机制,推动银行加深信息共享,同时通过公共征信系统和商业征信的共同辅助,形成相对完善的社会征信体系。 The decrease of asymmetry information between banks and borrowers benefits from information sharing mechanism among banks to a great degree. By analyzing motive mechanism of information sharing and cooperating through information sharing choice model, the paper believes that expectation value of information sharing is different to banks under current credit market structure, but compulsive information sharing by public organization is likely to produce two entirely different kinds of effects, one is dissociation, the other is participation. Therefore, the effective information sharing encouragement and restriction systems must be built up, which can push the banks to deepen information sharing to form relatively perfect social credit system, with assistance of public and private credit systems.

关 键 词： 信息不对称 信息共享 行为 征信体系

领　　域： [经济管理]