作　　者： ; ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学管理学院

出　　处： 《中山大学学报（社会科学版）》 2006年第6期83-91,共9页

摘　　要： 该文以2004年沪市的743家上市公司为样本,根据上市公司的实际控制人,将上市公司控制类型分成4类:政府控制、家族控制、广泛持有及其他。研究发现,上市公司控制权和现金流权的分离程度越高,财务绩效越差;家族控制公司比政府控制公司具有更高的分离系数和更复杂的金字塔结构,整体上家族控制公司比国有控制公司绩效更差;家族控制公司分离系数与公司历史和规模显著相关。此外,还发现中小股东对控制权和现金流权分离的约束力量有限。 This paper examines the separation of cash flow right and control right for 743 listed companies from Shanghai Stock Exchange in China.Based on types of the ultimate controller,it classifies these companies into 4 categories: the State-Controlled,the Family-Controlled,the Wildly-held and the Miscellaneous.It finds that the government controls 72.27% sample companies,while the family controls 19.78%(20% ultimate control right cutoff).The separation of cash flow right and control right destroy firms' financial performance.Compared with the state-controlled firms,the family-controlled firms have higher separation rate of cash flow right and control right,and the more complex pyramid controlling structures.Moreover,the family-controlled perform worse.The separation rate is highly correlated with family-controlled firms' history and scale.The family-controlled firms show more serious exploitation.In addition,we find that the ordinary investors have limited strength to restraint the exploitation of the controlling shareholders.

关 键 词： 控制权 现金流权 绩效 最终控制人 上市公司 持股结构

领　　域： [经济管理] [经济管理]