作　　者： ; ; ; ;

机构地区： 哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院

出　　处： 《系统工程理论与实践》 2006年第9期43-50,共8页

摘　　要： 为探究骇客与商业银行的博弈信念,在分析骇客与商业银行对银行网络安全系统进行攻击与防御博弈时的成本和收益的基础上,运用信号博弈模型研究了骇客与商业银行博弈的状况.认为商业银行欲避免骇客进攻,需通过媒体将声誉维持在较高水平,使骇客相信对此银行进行攻击,所获得收益低于投入进攻的平均直接成本;理性的商业银行出于成本的考虑,会希望在提高声誉过程中所获得的边际利润与因骇客进攻而导致的银行损失相等.由此,监管当局应通过增加对商业银行网络安全情况检查的频率,增加对商业银行因网络信息安全风险导致损失情况的曝光力度等措施来迫使商业银行加大对网络安全的投入. In order to investigate the game behind the hackers and commercial banks, this paper analyzes the costs and profits about the attack and the defense of commercial banks ＆ hackers, and studies the game status of hackers and commercial banks by signal game model. This paper figures that commercial banks should maintain its reputation at a higher level to prevent hacker＇s attack, and thus let the hacker to believe the profit will less than the average direct cost while making an attack. Regarding the cost, rational commercial banks may hope its marginal profit gained by the engagement in its reputation promotion equals to the banks＇ lose due to hacker＇s attack. This paper finally concluded that, the supervisor authorities should try to increase the inspection frequency about the status of commercial b^d~s＇ network security, as well as increase the media exposing level about the losing status caused by network information security risk, and thus force the commercial banks to increase its investment on network security.

关 键 词： 商业银行 网络安全 博弈论 骇客

领　　域： [经济管理]