作　　者： ; ;

机构地区： 中山大学岭南学院

出　　处： 《南方经济》 2006年第9期25-34,共10页

摘　　要： 以Shleifer与Vishny股市推动型并购理论为基础,本文提出了成长企业面临随机并购威胁的动态新模型,具体分析了在随机的股票市场产生定价错误和收购者预期有协同效应收益的情况下,利润最大化企业面对并购威胁所采取的防御性红利支付策略。本模型运用可靠性理论的“风险率”概念,不但解释了并购活动和观察到的成长型企业的红利支付行为,还导出了关于反并购成本影响目标企业价值的可验证性推论。 Built upon Shleifer and Vishny＂ s theory of stock-market-driven acquisitions, this paper proposes a dynamic model of the growth firm facing takeover threats stochastically. The formal analysis here focuses on the defensive payout strategy of value-maximizing management under the circumstances of random stock market valuation errors, and the bidders＂ perceived synergistic gains. By borrowing the concept of ＂hazard rate＂ from the reliability theory, the model does not only shed light on takeover activities and the observed payout behavior of growth companies, but also yields testable implications concerning the impact of anti-takeover costs on the target firm＇s value over time.

关 键 词： 并购防御 特殊红利 再投资 估值模型

领　　域： [经济管理]